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THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM ASSISTING
THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
BHARAT MALKANI*
Abstract In this paper, I assert that the prohibition on the death penalty
brings with it an obligation on abolitionist States to refrain from assisting
the use of the death penalty in retentionist States. By considering the law
on complicity and State responsibility, the obligation to protect under
international human rights law, and the practice of States, I argue that
although there are jurisdictional issues and although the death penalty is not
prohibited under general international law, an obligation to refrain from being
complicit in the death penalty is developing in international law.
Keywords: complicity, death penalty, diplomatic protection, extradition, mutual legal
assistance, obligation to protect, State responsibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
When a State abolishes the death penalty, its primary obligation is to refrain
from subjecting any individual within its jurisdiction to such a penalty. This
article argues that States that have ratiﬁed treaties prohibiting the death penalty
in all circumstances, such as the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR)1 and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights,2 are also under a secondary obligation to refrain
from facilitating the use of the death penalty elsewhere. Although many
abolitionist States already take steps to ensure that they are not complicit in the
use of the death penalty in retentionist States, recent developments suggest that
the legal, political and moral obligation to refrain from aiding and assisting the
use of the death penalty is wider than currently appreciated.
This paper begins by explaining what is meant by an obligation to refrain
from assisting the use of the death penalty, as the broad issue of complicity in
* Lecturer in Law, University of Birmingham, b.malkani@bham.ac.uk.
1 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221. Although art 2 of the ECHR permits the death penalty, the
European Court of Human Rights has held that this article has been amended by State practice so as
to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances. See Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (App no
614898/08) (2010) 51 EHRR 9.
2 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming
at the abolition of the death penalty (adopted 15 December 1989, entered into force 11 July 1991)
1642 UNTS 414 (at the time of writing, ratiﬁed by 75 States).
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the international legal system is complex. It is asserted that Article 16 of the
International Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles),3 when read in conjunction with
the ‘obligation to protect’ in international human rights law, points towards an
obligation on abolitionist States to do more than merely refrain from imposing
the death penalty.
Four ways in which a State might actually directly or indirectly assist the use
of the death penalty are then identiﬁed and the extent to which abolitionist
States are obliged to refrain from these actions and omissions is examined. The
ﬁrst concerns the obligations on abolitionist States to refrain from extraditing
or deporting anyone to another State where there is a risk that they will face the
death penalty, without obtaining adequate assurances that the death penalty
will not be imposed beforehand. Although this obligation is well established, it
is useful to outline the extent of this obligation, how this obligation has
developed and its rationale, in order to understand whether abolitionist States
might have similar obligations in diﬀerent contexts.
With this in mind, the article then moves onto the second potential method
of complicity by considering the scope of an abolitionist State’s obligation to
assist its nationals who are facing the death penalty abroad. Although the
decision to provide diplomatic protection is essentially at the discretion of the
executive, it is argued that this discretion is tempered in cases involving abuses
of fundamental human rights, which the death penalty is increasingly being
classiﬁed as. The third issue considered is how a State might provide mutual
legal assistance or police-to-police assistance in investigations that lead to the
imposition of the death penalty.4 It is argued that, as in extradition cases,
abolitionist States should refuse such assistance without assurances that the
death penalty will not be imposed. Consideration is also given to the conduct of
the United Nations in providing resources and intelligence in global anti-drug
traﬃcking eﬀorts to countries which impose the death penalty for drug
oﬀences, in violation of international law. The fourth issue concerns how a
State might provide, or enable the provision of, materials that are used in
executions. Given public pronouncements by States and private companies,
and the rationale behind the obligation to not extradite oﬀenders without
assurances, it is argued that more stringent controls need to be put in place to
ensure that exported materials are not used for the purposes of facilitating
executions.
3 The arts on State Responsibility are annexed to United Nations Resolution 56/83 adopted
by the General Assembly on 12 December 2001. The UK courts have recognized these articles to
be an authoritative statement of the principles of State responsibility (R v Lyons [2002]
UKHL 44 [36]).
4 Strictly speaking, extradition is a type or form of mutual legal assistance, and thus it might be
wondered why I have chosen to consider the two separately. As will become clear, abolitionist
States and international law have tended to treat the two diﬀerently in death penalty cases, and it is
for this reason that extradition is considered separately to mutual legal assistance cases.
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These last two methods of assisting the use of the death penalty are arguably
not prohibited, owing to jurisdictional issues. Even if jurisdictional issues
preclude an obligation in these situations, though, it can still be argued that
there is a political or moral obligation to refrain from aiding the death penalty
in these ways.
These obligations take on particular force when abolitionist States adopt
explicit policies for promoting the abolition of the death penalty worldwide, as
the United Kingdom did when the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce (FCO)
issued the ‘UK Strategy for Global Abolition of the Death Penalty’ in October
2010.5 If a State publicly and actively promotes the abolition of the death
penalty in other countries, then that State must be politically and morally
obliged, if not legally obliged, to ensure that it is not complicit in the
administration of the death penalty in those countries.
The article ends by suggesting that stronger legislative measures, or more
explicit governmental policies, which comprehensively set out the duty to not
aid executions abroad, are needed. In addition to domestic laws and policies, a
treaty or regulation at the international level should be developed, which
comprehensively sets out the duties on abolitionist States to refrain from
assisting the use of the death penalty in retentionist States.
II. COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
States have long been criticized and held responsible for aiding and assisting
violations of international law by third States.6 In recent years, for example,
the British Government has come under increasing scrutiny for its alleged
complicity in the commission of torture by agents of the United States of
America and of other States.7 It is necessary therefore to identify the existing
rules in relation to complicity in human rights violations, before applying these
rules to the issue of complicity in the death penalty.
When considering the extent to which States can be held responsible for
complicity in human rights violations, we are faced with a complex web of
rules and principles of international law. First and foremost are the primary
5 Available on the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce’s website: <http://www.fco.gov.
uk/resources/en/pdf/global-issues/human-rights/death-penalty-strategy-oct-11-15> accessed 8
October 2012. It is for this reason that reference is often made in this paper to the laws and
practice of the UK for illustrative purposes. The UK is also referred to for illustrative purposes
because, for the most part, it is an exemplar in ensuring that it is not complicit in executions.
6 For examples, see HP Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (CUP 2011)
107–69.
7 See, for example, Joint Committee on Human Rights, Twenty-Third Report of 2008–09,
‘Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture’ HL 152, HC 230, 21 July 2009. <http://www.
publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/152/15202.htm> accessed 8 October 2012.
Also see Human Rights Watch: ‘Cruel Britannia: British Complicity in the Torture and Ill-
treatment of Terror Suspects in Pakistan’ (November 2009) <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
ﬁles/reports/uk1109web_0.pdf> accessed 8 October 2012. It should be noted that the British
Government has rejected the ﬁndings of the Human Rights Watch investigation.
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rules of international human rights law that prohibit these conducts. The
prohibition on complicity in torture,8 for example, can be found either
explicitly in Article 4 of the Convention Against Torture (CAT),9 or implicitly
in the general prohibitions on torture in international law, including Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),10 and, at the
regional level, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR).11 Second, and seemingly quite separate to these primary rules of
international law, we might turn to Article 16 of the International Law
Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, which reads:
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: (a) that
State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful
act; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.
Article 16 operates as a secondary rule of international law, only coming into
play when there has been a violation of a primary, substantive rule of
international law.12
These options, whether relating to torture or another issue, are not mutually
exclusive. The interplay between State responsibility under human rights
law and State responsibility under the ILC Articles is not straightforward, and
has caused much consternation for lawyers and commentators alike.13 The
following discussion considers how these rules and principles of international
law operate in more detail, with a view to constructing a framework for
determining the conditions under which a State might be held responsible for
assisting the use of the death penalty.
A. Article 16 of the ILC Articles
On ﬁrst reading, it is tempting to use Article 16 as the basis of an obligation on
abolitionist States to not assist executions. Aust writes that Article 16 sets up
8 Torture is being used as an example because, as will be discussed, there is a wealth of
materials on complicity and torture.
9 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85
(CAT) art 1.
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 7.
11 Saadi v Italy (App no 37201/06) (2009) 49 EHRR 30.
12 It is not necessary to dwell on the distinction between primary and secondary rules of
international law here. Suﬃce to say that primary rules relate to substantive wrongs, such as the use
of torture, and secondary rules relate to procedural issues such as reparations for breaches of
primary rules, and so on.
13 For example, see the contributions of M Craven, B Conforti, MD Evans, and D McGoldrick
in M Fitzmaurice and D Sarooshi (eds), Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial
Institutions (OUP 2004). Each of these writers considers the issue of State responsibility under
human rights law, and how this relates to the ILC articles.
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three questions that need to be considered: what sort of conduct will trigger
responsibility for complicity, what exactly does the aiding State need to know,
and what is meant by the criterion in Article 16(b) that the ‘act would be
internationally wrongful if committed by [the aiding] State’?14 Although these
three questions are addressed throughout this paper, it is also noted that
Article 16 is rather narrow in scope, potentially presenting problems for the
arguments presented here.
In the Commentary to the ILC Articles, it is stated that ‘Article 16 limits
the scope of responsibility for aid and assistance in three ways.’15 First, the
assisting State must be aware of the circumstances that make the actions of the
third State internationally wrongful.16 As will be seen, though, abolitionist
States are often unaware that their actions might lead to the use of the death
penalty. Second, the assisting State must give aid or assistance with the
intention of facilitating the commission of the internationally wrongful act.17 It
is hardly ever the case, though, that abolitionist States directly intend to bring
about the death penalty through their conduct. Third, the act committed by the
principal State must also be internationally wrongful if committed by the
assisting State.18 For present purposes, this is easy to satisfy: States that have
ratiﬁed a treaty that prohibits the death penalty would fulﬁl this criterion if they
were to impose the death penalty. However, related to this is a problematic
fourth criterion: under Article 16, responsibility only arises if the State
committing the allegedly ‘wrongful’ act is prohibited from doing so.19 It
follows that an abolitionist State cannot be held responsible for assisting
executions in, for example, the United States of America, because there is no
rule of general international law that prohibits the death penalty,20 and it is only
those States party to treaties that prohibit the death penalty that commit an
internationally wrongful act by imposing the death penalty.21
14 HP Aust (n 6) 7.
15 Commentary to art 16, United Nations International Law Commission, Report on the Work
of its Fifty-Third Session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10/
2001/283, para 3. Also see Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (CUP 2002) 149.
16 Commentary to art 16, para 3. 17 ibid. 18 ibid.
19 J Cerone, ‘Re-examining International Responsibility: “Complicity” in the Context of
Human Rights Violations’ (2008) 14 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law
525, 531.
20 It should be noted, though, that there is a trend in international law towards the prohibition of
the death penalty. See W Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd
edn, Cambridge 2003). It is also well documented that States across the world are predominantly
moving towards abolition of the death penalty, with very few States introducing or expanding the
use of the death penalty. For a thorough analysis of the global trend towards abolition, see R Hood,
The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (4th edn, Oxford 2008) Also, it should be noted that
there are some general rules of international law that govern the use of the death penalty. For
example, international law prohibits the death penalty for oﬀenders under the age of 18, and thus
the United States of America would be committing an internationally wrongful act if it imposed the
death penalty on such oﬀenders, and the assisting State could therefore incur responsibility.
21 It is for this reason, therefore, that when I refer to ‘abolitionist States’ in this paper, I am
referring to those States that would be in violation of their obligations under international law if
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This approach to Article 16 implies that only in extreme cases would
abolitionist States incur responsibility for assisting the use of the death penalty.
However, Article 16 is not determinative of the issue, since it can be displaced
by the lex specialis on complicity in a particular area of law.22 It is argued here
that Article 16 can be complemented by the concept of the ‘obligation to
protect’ under international human rights law to develop the lex specialis on
complicity and the death penalty.23 It is necessary, therefore, to consider how
the obligation to protect is understood in terms of international human rights
law, in order to see how the two might work in tandem.
B. The Obligation to Protect in International Human Rights Law
The ‘obligation to protect’ in human rights law requires States to take steps to
prevent human rights abuses from occurring, either domestically or in third
States.24 For example, the right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR does not
merely require States to refrain from arbitrarily taking life, it also requires
States to protect lives by preventing third parties from killing.25 The European
Court of Human Rights has also interpreted the right to life under the ECHR to
include a positive duty to prevent lives from being taken.26 The principle of
non-refoulement derives from the idea that States should not put individuals in
situations where there is a risk that their rights will be abused, and it can
therefore be said that the duty to protect requires States to ensure that they do
not enable or assist a third party to engage in conduct that results in a violation
of a right. It is in this sense that we can say that the concept of complicity under
the ILC Articles and the concept of the obligation to protect are linked.
In some ways, though, the obligation to protect is analytically distinct from
the concept of State responsibility for complicity.27 As Aust writes,
. . . an infringement upon the prohibition of refoulement triggers the responsibility
of the extraditing State regardless of whether the [human rights abuse] eventually
materialises . . . [whereas] [i]n situations covered by the concept of complicity
[under the ILC Articles], no responsibility would intervene if the wrongful act of
they imposed the death penalty, rather than those States that have abolished the death penalty as a
matter of domestic law, but have not ratiﬁed any international treaty to that eﬀect.
22 Art 55 of the ILC arts states that ‘special rules of international law’ take precedence over the
arts, including art 16. This is so notwithstanding the alleged customary nature of art 16. See
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) [2007] ICJ Rep 43 [420] (the ICJ referring to art 16 as
‘reﬂecting a customary rule’.).
23 On the obligation to protect, see H Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Aﬄuence and US
Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Princeton 1996) 52.
24 M Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’ (2010) 21 EJIL 341, 376 (Hakimi notes that this
issue has not been considered in detail).
25 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, para 8.
26 Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 27 Hakimi (n 24) 353–4.
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the main actor was never committed as there is no such concept as an attempted
internationally wrongful act.28
Aust contends that this distinction is artiﬁcial, though, since both concepts are
concerned with ensuring that States do not act in such a way that brings about a
wrongful act. Conforti also notes that the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
contained a speciﬁc reference to the responsibility incurred by States for failing
to prevent a wrongful act from occurring.29 The decision to delete this
provision from the ﬁnal Articles could be understood as a rejection of this
concept, but Conforti notes that the Commission rejected the obligation to
protect because it believed that such an obligation is better understood as a
primary rule of international law, whereas the rules of State responsibility are
secondary rules of international law.30 Conforti, like Aust, argues that the
Commission was wrong to draw a sharp distinction between the two, and it is
argued here that the concepts of complicity and the obligation to protect can
work in tandem when assessing the scope of the obligations on abolitionist
States to refrain from assisting the use of the death penalty.
Hakimi has similarly addressed the interplay between the obligation to
protect in international human rights law, and the prohibition on complicity
under the ILC Articles: ‘A state that gives the abuser support not directed at
any particular misconduct is not responsible for assisting in the misconduct.
But that state may have an obligation to protect.’31 Put another way, even if
an assisting State’s conduct does not meet the stringent requirements for
complicity under Article 16 as discussed above, that State may nonetheless be
‘responsible because it failed to satisfy an aﬃrmative obligation to protect’.32
McGoldrick notes that the concept of State responsibility appears in human
rights legal discourse,33 and demonstrates that the ICCPR regime reﬂects
principles of State responsibility.34 However, in a study of the concept of State
responsibility before the European Court of Human Rights, Evans writes: ‘in
the human rights arena in general—including the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights—the language of State responsibility has
been . . . employed quite deliberately to broaden the scope of substantive legal
obligations.’35 Aust too notes that there are ‘special rules on complicity in
human rights law’ that are ‘more far-reaching’ than the concept of complicity
28 HP Aust (n 6) 396.
29 Art 23 of the Draft arts was concerned with the responsibility of States to prevent wrongful
acts. See B Conforti, ‘Exploring the Strasbourg Case-Law: Reﬂections on State Responsibility for
the Breach of Positive Obligations’ in M Fitzmaurice and D Sarooshi (eds), Issues of State
Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions (Hart 2004).
30 B Conforti (n 29) 136. 31 M Hakimi (n 24) 365. 32 ibid 354.
33 But note that, according to McGoldrick, ‘[t]here is little academic literature on
State responsibility in the human rights context, outside of the discussion of the ILC draft
Articles.’ D McGoldrick, ‘State Responsibility and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights’ in Fitzmaurice and Sarooshi (n 29) 167. 34 ibid 199.
35 MD Evans, ‘State Responsibility and the European Convention on Human Rights: Role and
Realm’ in Fitzmaurice and Sarooshi (n 29) 140.
Refraining from Assisting the Use of the Death Penalty 529
in Article 16.36 It is in this sense that it is argued here that the substantive
obligation to refrain from imposing the death penalty can be broadened by the
concepts of complicity and the obligation to protect to include a prohibition on
assisting the use of the death penalty.
From the discussion above regarding the law on complicity and the
obligation to protect, it follows that we must be clear about (a) which States are
prohibited from assisting the use of the death penalty, and (b) the conditions
under which such States might incur responsibility. With regard to the ﬁrst
question, States party to the ECHR and the Second Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR are prohibited from assisting the death penalty, since these two treaties
completely prohibit the death penalty. Although Article 2 of the ECHR
expressly permits the use of the death penalty in limited circumstances, the
European Court of Human Rights has held that the text of this article has been
de facto amended by State practice so as to prohibit the death penalty in all
circumstances in all Member States.37 The Second Optional Protocol is solely
concerned with the prohibition of the death penalty, and has been ratiﬁed by
75 States.38 Even though neither of these treaties explicitly prohibits
complicity in the death penalty, the lack of such a textual provision is not
necessarily a limitation on the arguments advanced here. As noted above, the
ECHR does not expressly prohibit complicity in torture, but the European
Court of Human Rights has read such a prohibition into Article 3. With regard
to the second question, it is again helpful to draw on the law of complicity in
the context of torture, for guidance on what sort of conduct might constitute
complicity.
C. Complicity in Other Areas of Human Rights Law
The law prohibiting complicity in torture is well established in international
law and in some domestic legal systems, and certain principles from such law
can be used to guide and develop the law on complicity in the death penalty.
The prohibition on complicity in torture can be found in Article 4(1) of the
Convention against Torture which, alongside the ILC Articles, were considered
authoritative statements of the law by the Joint Committee on Human Rights
(JCHR) in 2009, when it reported on allegations that the United Kingdom
had been complicit in torture by third States.39 For the purposes of State
responsibility, the JCHR surveyed relevant authorities and stated that
complicity in torture ‘means simply one State giving assistance to another
State in the commission of torture, or acquiescing in such torture, in the
knowledge, including constructive knowledge, of the circumstances of the
torture which is or has been taking place’.40
36 Aust (n 6) 390. 37 Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (n 1) [120].
38 It should be noted though that many of these 75 are also party to the ECHR.
39 JCHR (n 7) Also see Human Rights Watch (n 7). 40 JCHR (n 7) para 35.
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There are three aspects to the law on complicity in torture that can be used to
develop the law on complicity and the death penalty. First, one can look to
the law on torture for guidance on what sort of conduct constitutes complicity.
The JCHR listed several situations that would amount to unlawful complicity
in torture, including things such as the ‘provision of information to . . . a foreign
intelligence service enabling them to apprehend a . . . suspect [who is then
tortured]’.41 This can be applied to death penalty situations, in that the
provision of intelligence that leads to the imposition of the death penalty can
amount to complicity in the death penalty. Second, the JCHR read the ILC
Articles in conjunction with other rules and principles of international law,
supporting the argument that Article 16 is not determinative of the obligation to
not assist the use of the death penalty. Third, the JCHR did not refer to the
requirement of ‘intention’, ﬁnding ‘constructive knowledge’ to suﬃce. The
word ‘intention’ does not appear in Article 16 either, and therefore it is asserted
that abolitionist States can incur responsibility for aiding the use of the death
penalty even if such States do not directly intend their conduct to do so. It is
enough that such States ought to know that their conduct will facilitate the use
of the death penalty and, as will be explained, such States are becoming
increasingly aware of how their conduct might assist the use of the death
penalty elsewhere.
Therefore, even though there is no textual provision in international law
prohibiting abolitionist States from assisting the use of the death penalty, and
even though the death penalty is permitted under general international law,
State practice, read alongside actual and theoretical approaches to complicity
and the obligation to protect, points toward an emerging obligation. The
remainder of this article seeks to provide clariﬁcation of the extent of this
secondary obligation by considering four ways in which a State might be
complicit in the use of the death penalty elsewhere: (1) by extraditing an
oﬀender, (2) by failing to provide diplomatic protection to a national facing
the death penalty, (3) by providing mutual legal assistance, police-police
assistance, and other types of assistance and (4) by supplying, or allowing the
supply, of goods that can be used in executions.
III. THE OBLIGATION TO REFUSE EXTRADITION AND DEPORTATION
The extradition or deportation of an individual to a State where they are likely
to face the death penalty is an example of a State facilitating the use of the
death penalty elsewhere, since the death penalty can only be imposed with the
assistance of the extraditing State. It has been established by the UN Human
Rights Committee in Judge v Canada,42 and by the European Court of Human
Rights in Al-Saadoon v UK, that abolitionist States must seek assurances that
41 JCHR (n 7) para 43.
42 Judge v Canada, Comm No 829/1998, UN Doc CCPR/L/78//D/829/1998 (2003).
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the death penalty will not be imposed before extraditing or deporting an
individual to a State when there is a real risk that they will face the death
penalty.
Although there is considerable literature on this issue already,43 it is
necessary to examine the development of international and European human
rights law and the jurisprudence of some domestic courts on this point, in order
to appreciate how this obligation has come about, and the rationale for this
obligation.
A. When There Was No Obligation to Refuse Extradition
Many will be familiar with the case of Soering v United Kingdom, decided by
the European Court of Human Rights in 1989,44 and this section discusses how
the law has developed since this decision. In Soering, the applicant argued that
his proposed extradition from the UK to the USA violated his ECHR rights
because he faced a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty. The Court
held that the risk of being subjected to the death penalty did not violate
Soering’s right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR, because Article 2 explicitly
permitted the death penalty. However, the Court considered the manner in
which the death penalty was implemented, and held that there was a real risk of
Soering suﬀering from the ‘death row phenomenon’ while awaiting execution,
which would be contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR which prohibits cruel
treatment and punishment.45 The UK was therefore prohibited from extraditing
Soering to the US without adequate assurances that the death penalty would
not be sought.46
A similar approach was taken contemporaneously outside the European
context. Two years after Soering, in Kindler v Canada, the Supreme Court of
Canada also refused to rule that the risk of the imposition of the death penalty
in and of itself placed an obligation on the abolitionist State to refuse
extradition without assurances that the death penalty would not be sought.47
When the UN Human Rights Committee heard the case in 1993, the
Committee also decided that Canada had no duty to demand an assurance
43 For example, see J Yorke, ‘Europe’s Judicial Inquiry in Extradition Cases: Closing the Door
on the Death Penalty’ (2004) 29 ELR 546; A Clapham, ‘Symbiosis in International Human Rights
Law: The Öcalan Case and the Evolving Law on the Death Sentence’ (2003) 1 JICJ 475; A
Sherlock, ‘Extradition, Death Row and the Convention’ (1990) 15 ELR 87; J Dugard and C Van
den Wyngaert, ‘Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights’ (1998) 92 AJIL 187; CR Roecks,
‘Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse to Extradite a
Person Charged with a Capital Crime’ (1994) 25 CalWIntlLJ 189.
44 Soering v United Kingdom (App no 14038/88) (1989) 11 EHRR 439.
45 The ‘death row phenomenon’ refers to the mental anguish that an individual might suﬀer
when awaiting execution on death row. In this case, the individual’s age of 19 years was a factor
that was taken into account.
46 Although some assurances had been given in this case, the Court agreed with the applicant
that the assurances were very vague and did not rule out the possibility of the death penalty
altogether. 47 Kindler v Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 SCR 779.
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that the death penalty would not be imposed.48 It is clear, therefore, that in the
early 1990s there was no international obligation on abolitionist States to refuse
the extradition of an individual to States where they might face the death
penalty.
B. The Development of the Obligation to Refuse Extradition
In 2001, in United States v Burns, the Canadian Supreme Court revisited its
reasoning and decision in Kindler, and held that assurances must be sought in
extradition cases involving the death penalty in all but the most exceptional
of circumstances.49 To do otherwise would be contrary to section 7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protects the rights to life,
liberty and security of the person. The Court based its reasoning on the
international trend toward abolitionism: ‘The arguments against extradition
without assurances have grown stronger since this Court decided
Kindler . . . Canada is now abolitionist for all crimes, even those in the military
ﬁeld. The international trend against the death penalty has become clearer.’50
The UN Human Rights Committee picked up on this trend and in 2003 also
reversed its decision in Kindler. In Judge v Canada, the HRC said that since
Kindler, ‘there has been a broadening international consensus in favour of
abolition of the death penalty’,51 and that therefore, ‘[f]or countries that have
abolished the death penalty, there is an obligation not to expose a person to the
real risk of its application.’52 Furthermore, the HRC said that there would be a
violation of the right to life under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights if an abolitionist State placed somebody at risk of the death
penalty. This is a crucial development from the 1990s jurisprudence, which
had only prevented extradition when the manner of the imposition of the death
penalty constituted cruel or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.53
In the UN Secretary-General’s Eighth Quinquennial Report on the status of
the death penalty worldwide between 2004 and 2008, it is noted that ‘[w]ith
one exception, all fully abolitionist States responding to the questionnaire
declared a policy of denying extradition to States where the death penalty
might be imposed, unless assurances were given that the individual concerned
could not be sentenced to death or, if sentenced to death, that the penalty would
not be carried out.’54 Only two abolitionist States are identiﬁed in the Report as
having policies that do not unequivocally require assurances that the death
48 Kindler v Canada, Comm No 470/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993) [14.6].
49 United States v Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283 (Canada). 50 ibid [131].
51 Judge v Canada (n 42) [10.3]. 52 ibid [10.4].
53 For example, Ng v Canada, Comm No 469/1991, UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994);
Soering v United Kingdom (n 44).
54 United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report on capital punishment and
implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death
penalty (18 December 2009) para 9. Available at <http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/
CCPCJ_session19/E2010_10eV0989256.pdf> accessed 8 October 2012.
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penalty will not be sought: Canada has a policy to obtain assurances ‘in all
but exceptional circumstances’ and in Australia the ‘Attorney General has
a residual power, “in ill-deﬁned circumstances, to allow the extradition of a
person to a State where he or she may face the death penalty” ’.55
Returning to the European context, the European Union responded to
the strengthening of the ‘abolition norm’56 in international law and, more
speciﬁcally, European human rights law by including a provision in the
Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000 that reads: ‘No one may be removed,
expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she
would be subjected to the death penalty . . . .’57 In 2005, in Öcalan v Turkey,
the European Court of Human Rights was invited to ﬁnd that Article 2(1) of
the ECHR had been amended by State practice so as to prohibit the death
penalty outright. The Court accepted that movements within the Council of
Europe towards the absolute prohibition of the death penalty could signal ‘an
agreement [of the Contracting States] to abrogate the exception provided for in
the second sentence of Article 2(1)’.58 However, although the Court did not
exclude the possibility that Article 2(1) had been amended, it refrained from
ﬁnding that Article 2 had been modiﬁed so as to no longer permit the death
penalty.59
In Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom in 2010, though, the Court went beyond
its decision in Öcalan and accepted that Article 2 could be said to have been
amended by State practice. In this case, the applicants argued that their transfer
from UK custody to Iraqi authorities to stand trial in Iraq for various oﬀences
violated their ECHR rights because they faced a real risk of being subjected to
the death penalty. The Court held that the proposed transfer of the prisoners,
without an assurance that the death penalty would not be sought, violated the
applicants’ right to life under the Convention. The Court noted that all but two
Member States have signed Protocol No. 13 to the ECHR, which prohibits the
death penalty in all circumstances, and all but three of the Member States that
had signed the Protocol had ratiﬁed the Protocol too. This led the Court to
state: ‘These ﬁgures, together with consistent state practice in observing the
moratorium on capital punishment, are strongly indicative that Article 2 has
been amended so as to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances.’60 It
followed, for the Court, that ‘Article 2 of the Convention and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 13 prohibit the extradition or deportation of an individual to
55 ibid (quoting the Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on Australia (CCPR/
C/AUS/CO/5), para 20).
56 The ‘abolition norm’ refers to the emerging norm in international law that demands the
prohibition of the death penalty. See B Malkani, ‘The Judicial Use of International and Foreign
Law in Death Penalty Cases: A Poisoned Chalice?’ in A Sarat (ed), Is the Death Penalty Dying?
(vol 42 Studies in Law, Politics and Society, Elsevier 2008).
57 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ EC 18 December 2000, 2000/C
364/1, art 19(2).
58 Öcalan v Turkey (App no 46221/99) (2005) 41 EHRR 985 [162].
59 ibid [162]–[165] Also see Clapham (n 43) 475. 60 Al-Saadoon (n 1) [120].
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another State where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he
or she would face a real risk of being subjected to the death penalty there.’61
The Court rejected the UK Government’s argument that it was bound by
international law to transfer the prisoners to Iraqi authorities notwithstanding
the possibility of death sentences being imposed, because of the ‘fundamental
nature’ of the right not to be subjected to the death penalty. The Court held:
. . . it is not open to a Contracting State to enter into an agreement with another
State which conﬂicts with its obligations under the Convention. This principle
carries all the more force in the present case given the absolute and fundamental
nature of the right not to be subjected to the death penalty and the grave and
irreversible harm risked by the applicants.62
C. Conclusions
As international and European human rights law has moved towards the
prohibition of the death penalty on the grounds that it is a violation of the right
to life, there has been a correlative development of an obligation to refrain from
extraditing or deporting an individual to a State where they might face the death
penalty. The way in which this obligation has developed, and its scope, has
ramiﬁcations for the argument that abolitionist States are obliged to refrain from
assisting the use of the death penalty in other ways. It is signiﬁcant that both the
European Court and the HRC considered it irrelevant that the death penalty was
lawful in the third State in the respective cases. This has implications for the
way in which Article 16 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility is used to
develop a lex specialis on the topic of complicity and the death penalty. The
issue is not whether the executing State would violate international law itself: it
is the obligations of the abolitionist States that matter here.
As will be explained, though, the obligations to provide diplomatic
protection; to refrain from providing mutual legal assistance or police-to-
police assistance; and to refrain from providing materials that are used in
executions, are not as historically well established as the obligation to refuse
extradition without assurances that the death penalty will not be used.
However, taking the principles established by the development of the
prohibition on extradition, and taking recent developments in these ﬁelds into
account, it is argued that the obligations on abolitionist States to refrain from
other activities that facilitate the use of the death penalty is wider than currently
appreciated by such States.
IV. ASSISTING NATIONALS ABROAD WHO ARE FACING THE DEATH PENALTY
In situations where a State’s national is facing the death penalty abroad, the
question arises regarding the obligation of the home State to protect their
61 ibid [123]. 62 ibid [138] (emphasis added).
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national from the death penalty by providing diplomatic or consular assistance.
The traditional view is that the State has a discretionary power, but is
not obliged, to oﬀer protection. It is argued here, though, that the State’s
discretionary power is fettered in cases involving the death penalty.
Before setting out and critiquing the legal position, it is worth being clear
about how a failure to provide diplomatic assistance can be construed as
complicity in the death penalty. Put simply, foreign nationals who are arrested
are often unable to understand the case that is being made against them, due to
language barriers and unfamiliarity with the foreign legal system. Consular
assistance can remedy this by ensuring that the individual is aware of such
rights as the right to silence, and that the individual is able to present
any relevant defences, or any relevant mitigating circumstances. Consular
assistance thus reduces the risk of a wrongful conviction, and reduces the
likelihood of the imposition of the death penalty.63 Even if a State only
becomes aware that its national is on death row after a sentence of death has
been imposed, the home State can still assist with appeals and with making
applications for clemency. If it can be shown that the chances of execution
decrease when a home State intervenes on behalf of its national, then it can
be inferred that a deliberate omission to provide assistance comes with it
constructive knowledge on the part of the home State that it is making the
imposition of the death penalty likelier.64 If we accept this argument,65 then we
need to consider the extent to which abolitionist States are obliged to provide
diplomatic assistance to nationals facing the death penalty abroad. It is
concluded here that although States retain discretion whether to provide
assistance or not, this discretion is tempered in death penalty cases. It is argued
that there is a legitimate expectation that States will assist their nationals who
are facing the death penalty abroad, and that domestic courts should take action
if and when the relevant domestic authorities refuse to provide protection
without giving suﬃciently good reasons.
63 C Buys, S Pollock and I Pellicer, ‘Do Unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance
with Consular Notiﬁcation Rights’ (2011) DukeJComp&IntlL 461, 466–75. Also see the European
Commission funded ‘European Foreign Nationals Facing the Death Penalty’ project run by the
charity Reprieve. This Project aims to ensure that foreign nationals are provided with assistance
from consular oﬃcials, with the founder of Reprieve asserting that governmental assistance makes
a ‘life and death’ diﬀerence because, rather than seeking to execute ‘some anonymous individual’,
the State is instead attempting to execute an individual who has the force of a government behind
them. See <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/ecproject/> The interview with Clive
Staﬀord Smith, in which he explains how consular assistance can help prevent executions, begins
at 1:57 in the embedded video.
64 On constructive knowledge being suﬃcient, see JCHR (n 7) para 35.
65 It should be noted that there are many instances in which the home State has intervened but
has not been able to prevent the execution of one of its nationals. For examples see LaGrand Case
(Germany v United States of America) [2001] ICJ Rep 466; Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US
331 (2006); B Simma and C Hoppe, ‘From LaGrand and Avena to Medellin—A Rocky Road
Toward Implementation’ (2006) 14 TulJIntl&CompL 7; and the execution of British national
Akmal Shaikh in China on 29 December 2009 (for information on this case, see <http://www.
reprieve.org.uk/cases/akmalshaikh/> accessed 8 October 2012.
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A. The Position in International Law
The position in international law is clear. Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations provides a right for individuals to request
consular assistance if they are arrested while abroad, and to be informed of this
right.66 However, there is no corresponding duty on the State of nationality
to intervene and provide assistance. Despite the attempts of the Special
Rapporteur, John Dugard, to establish a ‘duty to protect’, the ILC aﬃrmed the
traditional approach in its 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection,67 a
position which is consistent with general international law and UK authority.68
There are at least two reasons for adopting this position. The ﬁrst relates to
practical considerations, since it is arguably not feasible for a State to protect
every national abroad. However, this is not so relevant in death penalty cases,
since such cases are relatively rare. Another rationale for the rule lies in the
requirement for States to take into account relations with foreign States. On
occasion, it might be in the State’s overall interests not to interfere with the way
in which a third State is treating its national, and it is certainly plausible that
foreign relations concerns might weigh heavily on a State that is asked to
protect a national abroad, regardless of whether they are facing the death
penalty.
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility also do not provide a means for
arguing that States are obliged to provide assistance, since the causal link
between the omission to assist and the imposition of the death penalty is
probably too remote for the purposes of responsibility. Although Article 16 is
not determinative, when read in light of the restatement of the law on
diplomatic protection in 2006, it is diﬃcult to make the argument that
international law obliges abolitionist States to provide diplomatic protection in
all death penalty cases. However, recent developments in States such as the UK
and South Africa suggest that there is a legitimate expectation that States will
assist their nationals who are facing the death penalty abroad, and that domestic
courts are able to take action if and when the relevant domestic authorities
refuse to provide protection without suﬃciently good reasons.
66 But note the many cases in which individuals have not been informed of this right upon
arrest, and have subsequently faced capital charges. In some cases, the individual’s home State has
voluntarily intervened and attempted to prevent the execution. The eﬀorts of Paraguay, Germany
and Mexico to assist their nationals on death row in the United States of America, for example, has
been well documented: see for example Simma and Hoppe (n 65); C Hoppe ‘Implementation of
LaGrand and Avena in Germany and the United States: Exploring a Transatlantic Divide in Search
of a Uniform Interpretation of Consular Rights’ (2007) 18 EJIL 317.
67 On the eﬀorts of John Dugard to establish a duty to protect, and on the eventual rejection of
Dugard’s proposals, see CF Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (OUP 2008) 80–90.
68 China Navigation Co Ltd v Attorney General [1932] 2 KB 197.
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B. Developments in National Law Creating an Obligation
Although international law currently accepts that diplomatic protection is
basically a discretionary matter for States, many States have created an
obligation to provide assistance as a matter of domestic law. Laws to this extent
can be found in the constitutional provisions of, inter alia, Hungary, Portugal,
Poland, Ukraine, and Cambodia.69 The German Federal Constitutional Court
has taken the view that diplomatic protection must be exercised70 as long as
such assistance ‘does not run counter to truly overriding interests of the Federal
Republic’.71
Even within the UK, which has traditionally adhered to the view that the
power to exercise diplomatic protection is a matter of executive discretion, as
part of the Royal Prerogative, the courts have been increasingly assertive,
especially with respect to nationals who are facing human rights violations
abroad. This issue has arisen in the context of British nationals being held by
United States authorities in Guantánamo Bay. Although the English courts
have reiterated the wide discretion aﬀorded to the executive, they have
restrained that discretion somewhat by stating that individuals have a legitimate
expectation72 that the State will at least consider helping them if they are
subject to human rights violations. That is, there is a procedural obligation to
consider providing diplomatic protection, even if there is no substantive
obligation to actually provide assistance in any given case. This expectation
takes on more force in cases involving serious violations of human rights,
which the death penalty is increasingly being classiﬁed as.
In R(Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aﬀairs,
the Court of Appeal concluded that the British Government is under no duty to
ensure that non-Contracting Parties (in this case, the US) observe the ECHR,
and that it is not obliged to provide a remedy for violations of the ECHR
committed by non-Contracting Parties when UK authorities are not complicit
or causally connected to the violations.73 Moreover, in Lord Phillips’words: ‘It
is clear that international law has not yet recognised that a State is under a duty
to intervene by diplomatic or other means to protect a citizen who is suﬀering
or threatened with injury in a foreign State.’74 However, the process by which
the State reaches a decision in such cases can be open to judicial review.75 In
this particular case, though, it was clear that the Government had considered
Mr Abbasi’s case, and its substantive decision not to assist Abbasi was not
69 For a more comprehensive outline of which States have created a duty to provide diplomatic
protection, see Amerasinghe (n 67) 82.
70 Hess-Entscheidung, 7 July 1975, BVerfGE 55 (reproduced in 90 ILR (1992) 387) (cited by
Amerasinghe (n 67) at 83).
71 WK Geck ‘Diplomatic Protection’ (1992) 1 EPIL 1052 (cited by Amerasinghe (n 67) at 83).
72 On this, see CRG Murray, ‘In the Shadow of Lord Haw Haw: Guantánamo Bay, Diplomatic
Protection and Allegiance’ [2011] PL 115, especially at 122–4.
73 R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aﬀairs [2002] EWCA Civ
1598. 74 ibid [69]. 75 ibid [106(i)].
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open to review. The courts followed this line of reasoning in the case of
Al Rawi: despite evidence that the claimants had been ill-treated by US
authorities, the English courts held that they could not compel the Government
to act if there was no evidence that UK authorities had colluded in such
treatment.76
On ﬁrst reading, these two cases do not support the claim that abolitionist
States are under a duty to assist nationals facing the death penalty abroad.
However, there are at least two reasons for arguing that these cases actually do
point towards such an obligation. First, the courts in Abbasi and Al-Rawi
emphasized that the State will not be compelled to provide assistance when
there is no evidence of collusion in the human rights abuse. On this point, it
is arguable that death penalty cases are distinguishable from Abbasi and
Al-Rawi because, as argued above, the State’s inaction in death penalty cases
facilitates or makes the imposition of the death penalty more likely. This is
distinguishable from Abbasi and Al-Rawi, as in these cases the human rights
abuses had already occurred, or were already occurring, prior to the State’s
inaction.
Second, the political eﬀects of the Abbasi and Al Rawi judgments have had a
considerable impact on the practice of diplomatic protection. Both cases had a
‘ripple eﬀect’77 in that they stirred public opinion about the treatment of British
citizens in Guantánamo Bay to such an extent that the Government felt
compelled politically to seek their release from custody. Having done so, it is
arguable that the UK Government has created a legitimate expectation for other
individuals who are the subject of serious human rights violations while
abroad. With the European Court of Human Rights stating that the imposition
of the death penalty now constitutes a violation of ‘fundamental’ human
rights under the ECHR in Al-Saadoon, it is plausible to argue that the UK
Government is compelled to exercise diplomatic protection in cases involving
British citizens facing the death penalty abroad.78
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has supported the contention that
States are under a duty to exercise diplomatic protection in cases involving
serious violations of fundamental human rights. In Kaunda, decided in 2004,
69 South Africans were arrested in Zimbabwe with a view to extraditing them
76 R (Al-Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Aﬀairs [2006] EWCA Civ
1279.
77 CRGMurray, ‘The Ripple Eﬀect: Guantanamo Bay in the United Kingdom’s Courts’ (2010)
1 Pace International Law Review Online Companion 15.
78 See, for example, the indication given by the British Government in ‘Support for British
Nationals Abroad: A Guide’, issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce. On page 19 of the
Guide, the following is written: ‘If you are facing a charge that carries the death penalty, or if you
have been sentenced to death, we will normally raise your case at whatever stage and level we judge
to be appropriate.’ <http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/2855621/english> accessed 8
October 2012. Although the British Government does routinely assist nationals on death row
abroad, the Government is not always able to prevent the execution. See, for example, the
execution of Akmal Shaikh in China 29 December 2009 <http://www.reprieve.org.uk/cases/
akmalshaikh/> accessed 8 October 2012.
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to Equatorial Guinea to face charges relating to an attempted coup in that
country.79 Fearing an unfair trial, ill-treatment and the death penalty, Kaunda
et al petitioned the South African government to ensure that their rights under
the South African Constitution were not violated. The Constitutional Court
held that there was no obligation in either South African law or international
law on States to provide diplomatic protection in such cases. However, the
Court’s reasoning and approach to the issue renders it possible to argue that
there is now an obligation on the State to exercise diplomatic protection in
cases involving the death penalty.
Chief Justice Chaskalson said that South African nationals may request ‘the
protection of South Africa in a foreign country in case of need’80 and may
‘have the request considered and responded to appropriately’.81 The exact
response to such a request, though, is at the discretion of the executive branch
of government. Interestingly, though, the Court stated that there is still room for
judicial oversight, and if the response is made in bad faith or is irrational, then
the Court could order the executive to ‘deal with the matter properly.’82
Moreover, in their concurring opinions, Justice Ngcobo said that the State is
‘obliged to take some steps when an egregious violation is being committed’,83
and Justice O’Regan said that there is a duty not ‘to ignore’ the request for
diplomatic protection by ‘a citizen who is threatened with or has experienced
an egregious violation of human rights norms’.84 Justice Sachs was of the
opinion that the government is obliged ‘to do whatever is reasonably within its
power to prevent South Africans abroad . . . from being subjected to torture,
grossly unfair trials and capital punishment’.85 These statements reﬂect Chief
Justice Chaskalson’s view:
There may . . . be a duty on government, consistent with its obligations under
international law, to take action to protect one of its citizens against a gross abuse
of international human rights norms. A request to government for assistance in
such circumstances where the evidence is clear would be diﬃcult, and in extreme
cases possibly impossible to refuse. It is unlikely that such a request would ever
be refused by government, but if it were, the decision would be justiciable and a
court would order the government to take appropriate action.86
The Court ultimately held that there was no obligation on the State to protect
nationals from the death penalty because international law does not forbid
capital punishment. In other words, the imposition of the death penalty was
not considered to be an ‘egregious’ violation or ‘gross abuse’ of human rights.
Speciﬁcally, the Court said: ‘Although the abolitionist movement is growing
stronger at an international level, capital punishment is not prohibited by
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights or the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and is still not impermissible under
79 Kaunda and others v President of the Republic of South Africa (2005) 4 SA 235.
80 ibid [62]. 81 ibid [63]. 82 ibid [80]. 83 ibid [164].
84 ibid [238]. 85 ibid [275]. 86 ibid [69].
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international law.’87 This decision, though, was issued in 2004. We have
already seen above that international law, especially European human rights
law, has since moved towards abolition. Given the decision in Al-Saadoon
in 2010, it is arguable that if the facts of Kaunda came before the European
Court of Human Rights today, and the Court was to follow the South
African Constitutional Court’s approach, the European Court would say: ‘the
abolitionist movement has grown stronger at an international level, and capital
punishment is prohibited by the European Convention on Human Rights’. If
the death penalty is classiﬁed as an ‘egregious’ human rights violation, it
arguably follows that there is a duty, at least on States party to the ECHR, to
provide diplomatic protection when its individuals are facing the death penalty
abroad.
C. Conclusions
While States will always have a degree of discretion in the ﬁeld of diplomatic
protection, it is arguable from Kaunda and Al-Saadoon that courts—both
domestic and international— should not unquestionably defer to the judgment
of the executive when the State decides not to assist a national facing the death
penalty abroad. Indeed, it is diﬃcult to think of a ‘good’ reason for not oﬀering
protection. It is arguably easier to think of ‘good’ reasons for extraditing an
oﬀender notwithstanding the risk of the death penalty. For example, if the
individual concerned in an extradition case is considered to be a signiﬁcant
threat to the public, an abolitionist State might have good reasons for wishing
to ensure that that person is extradited. However, the law is quite clear in
extradition cases that such reasons will not be accepted, and it follows that the
law should be reluctant to accept reasons for not providing diplomatic
assistance in death penalty cases. Having said this, the obligation to consider
exercising protection cannot yet extend to a mandatory obligation to provide
protection in all cases involving the death penalty.
V. THE OBLIGATION TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE IN CASES THAT MIGHT
LEAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Mutual legal assistance and police-to-police assistance are the processes
through which one State provides assistance to another State with evidence,
resources and/or intelligence in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
oﬀences in that other State.88 In addition to case-speciﬁc assistance, ongoing
inter-State assistance is also a feature of initiatives to combat transnational
87 ibid [98].
88 Mutual legal assistance is the phrase applicable when a judicial or prosecuting authority in
another State makes a request to another State for assistance, whereas police-to-police assistance is
the phrase applicable when the police force of one country makes a request to the police force of
another country for assistance.
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crimes, such as drug smuggling and human traﬃcking. In some cases, such
assistance can lead to the arrest, trial and execution of an individual.89 Some
anecdotal examples are provided in order to illustrate exactly how the provision
of assistance can comprise complicity in the use of the death penalty. This is
followed by the argument that abolitionist States are obliged to withhold
assistance from retentionist States without assurances that the death penalty
will not be imposed in any conviction that results from such assistance, at least
when it may be reasonably anticipated that the death penalty will be sought in
any resulting criminal case.
A. Examples of Assistance Facilitating the Use of the Death Penalty
In 2011, the Attorney General of Antigua revealed that UK authorities had
provided assistance in a homicide investigation without assurances that the
death penalty would not be sought. With the UK’s assistance, Antiguan
authorities arrested two individuals and sought to sentence them to death,
notwithstanding the UK’s belated request for the death penalty not to be
imposed. According to the Attorney General: ‘having given us the assistance,
[the British government] basically indicated that they hoped we would take
their views into consideration in terms of this matter.’90 Although the death
penalty was ultimately not imposed on the oﬀenders in question, this was
because of the presiding judge’s opinion that the facts of the case did not
warrant the death penalty, and not because of the British government’s
post-assistance request.91 In February 2012, two senior police oﬃcers from
Dyfed-Powys Police were sent to Thailand to assist the Thai authorities
with the investigation of the murder of a UK national in 2000. No discussions,
however, have taken place regarding sentencing in this case, leaving it
possible that UK police could be complicit in the imposition of the death
penalty if such a penalty is sought as the result of any arrest arising from the
investigation.92
Assistance on an ongoing basis in order to combat transnational crimes has
also been provided by abolitionist States without due regard to the possibility
of death sentences being imposed. For example, the UK government, alongside
89 On the tension between respecting human rights generally and the need to provide and
receive mutual legal assistance, see R Currie, ‘Human Rights and International Mutual Legal
Assistance: Resolving the Tension’ (2000) 11 CrimLF 143.
90 R Turner ‘Death penalty not ruled out as killers of Welsh honeymooners face sentencing’
Wales on Sunday (25 September 2011) < http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/2011/
09/25/death-penalty-not-ruled-out-as-killers-of-welsh-honeymooners-face-sentencing-91466-
29482484/> accessed 8 October 2012.
91 ‘Mullany Murders: Honeymooners’ Killers Jailed for Life’ BBC News (16 December 2011)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-west-wales-16214772> accessed 8 October 2012.
92 Request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and response on ﬁle
with the author; B Wright, ‘British police assist Thai murder enquiry’ The Independent (London,
16 February 2012) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/british-police-assist-thai-
murder-inquiry-6988692.html> accessed 8 October 2012.
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other governments and international organizations such as the United
Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the European
Commission, provide various types of assistance in counter-narcotics
eﬀorts in Iran, yet Iran regularly imposes the death penalty for drug-related
oﬀences.93 As stated by the International Harm Reduction Agency (IHRA):
‘In countries that have legislation allowing for the death penalty for drug
oﬀences, such funding, training and capacity-building activities—if successful
—result in increased convictions of persons on drug charges and
therefore potentially increase death sentences and executions.’94 The IHRA
has claimed that as a direct result of a project funded by, inter alia, the
United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the European Commission, a drug
traﬃcker named Han Yongwan was arrested, tried, and executed in China
on 26 June 2008.95
More recent reports by Harm Reduction International (formerly IHRA) and
Human Rights Watch, in June and August 2012 respectively, detail how a
steep rise in the number of executions for drug-related oﬀences in Iran,
Afghanistan and Pakistan has coincided with the provision of money and
equipment supplied by the UNODC for anti-drug traﬃcking initiatives.
Abolitionist States such as the UK, France and Canada are named as donor
States to the UNODC.96 Japan is also listed as a donor State and, while Japan
has not abolished the death penalty outright, it has abolished the death penalty
for drug oﬀences in line with international standards on the death penalty.
Since the death penalty for drug oﬀences is an ‘internationally wrongful act’,
retentionist States could also incur responsibility for complicity in the
imposition of the death penalty for drug related oﬀences.97
Recently, abolitionist States and other organizations have indicated an
awareness that the provision of case-speciﬁc and ongoing assistance can
93 ‘Death Penalty for Drug Oﬀences: Global Overview 2010’ International Harm Reduction
Association (3 June 2010) <http://www.ihra.net/ﬁles/2010/06/16/IHRA_DeathPenalty
Report_Web.pdf> accessed 8 October 2012.
94 ‘Complicity or Abolition? The Death Penalty and International Support for Drug
Enforcement’ (2010) International Harm Reduction Agency (21 June 2010) 6 <http://www.ihra.
net/ﬁles/2010/06/20/IHRA_ComplicityorAbolition.pdf> accessed 8 October 2012.
95 ibid 20.
96 See the press release issued by Human Rights Watch: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/
21/iran-donors-should-reassess-anti-drug-funding> accessed 8 October 2012; Harm Reduction
International, ‘Partners in Crime: International Funding for Drug Control and Gross Violations of
Human Rights’ (2012). <http://www.ihra.net/ﬁles/2012/06/20/Partners_in_Crime_web1.pdf>
accessed 8 October 2012. Also see J Doward, ‘Has Britain’s war on drugs led to more
executions in Iran?’ The Guardian 15 September 2012 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/
sep/15/britain-drugs-war-executions-iran?INTCMP=SRCH> accessed 8 October 2012.
97 HRC Concluding Observations: Iran, UN Doc CCPR/C/79/Add.25 (1993) para 8: ‘considers
the imposition of [the death] penalty . . . for crimes that do not result in loss of life, as being contrary
to the Covenant’. Indeed, it is remarkable that the United Nations plays such a major role in the
provision of assistance and resources when it is the United Nations that has been one of the major
proponents for the abolition of the death penalty, especially for drug oﬀences.
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facilitate the use of the death penalty elsewhere. In December 2010, the
European Parliament called for guidelines to govern
international funding for country-level and regional drug enforcement activities to
ensure such programmes do not result in human rights violations, including the
application of the death penalty; [and has stressed] that the abolition of the death
penalty for drug-related oﬀences should be made a precondition for ﬁnancial
assistance, technical assistance, capacity-building and other support for drug
enforcement.98
In the UK, in 2011, the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce issued a document
titled ‘Overseas Security and Justice Assistance: Human Rights Guidance’ to
all staﬀ involved in the provision of assistance overseas, making it clear that
oﬃcials should seek assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed
prior to providing assistance in both case-speciﬁc situations, and on an ongoing
basis.99 In 2012, the UNODC issued a ‘position paper’100 setting out the
organization’s human rights obligations, recognizing the ‘obligation to protect’
under human rights law.101 According to the position paper, ‘[i]f . . . a country
actively continues to apply the death penalty for drug oﬀences, UNODC places
itself in a very vulnerable position vis-à-vis its responsibility to respect human
rights if it maintains support to law enforcement units, prosecutors or courts
within the criminal justice system.’ The document goes on to explicitly address
the issue of State responsibility:
Whether support technically amounts to aid or assistance to the human rights
violation will depend upon the nature of technical assistance provided and the
exact role of the counterpart in arrest, prosecutions and convictions that result in
application of the death penalty. Even training of border guards who are
responsible for arrest of drug traﬃckers ultimately sentenced to death may be
considered suﬃciently proximate to the violation to engage international
responsibility.102
This resonates with the Commentaries to the ILC Articles: ‘There is no
requirement that the aid or assistance should have been essential to the
98 European Parliament resolution of 16 December 2010 on the Annual Report on Human
Rights in the World 2009 and the European Union’s policy on the matter [65] <http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0489&language=EN>
accessed 8 October 2012.
99 ‘Overseas Security and Justice Assistance: Human Rights Guidance’ (OSJA Guidance)
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/global-issues/human-rights/osja-guidance-151211.pdf>
accessed 8 October 2012. Also, In July 2012, an Early Day Motion was tabled before Parliament
calling on the Government to promote anti-drug traﬃcking initiatives that ‘respect, protect and
fulﬁl human rights.’ The Early Day Motion can be read at <http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2012-
13/by-topic/724/drugs-crimes> (EDM No 384) accessed 8 October 2012.
100 UNODC, ‘UNODC and the promotion and protection of human rights’ <http://www.unodc.
org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/UNODC_HR_position_paper.pdf> accessed 8
October 2012. 101 ibid 4. 102 ibid 10 (emphasis in original).
544 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
performance of the internationally wrongful act; it is suﬃcient if it contributed
signiﬁcantly to that act.’103
The approaches taken by the European Parliament, the FCO and the
UNODC are comparable to the approach taken by abolitionist States in
diplomatic protection cases: attempts should be made by the abolitionist State
to ensure that the death penalty is not imposed before providing assistance, but
States are under no legal duty to withhold assistance without assurances
that the death penalty will not be imposed. Such an approach, though, is not
appropriate. Mutual legal assistance and police-to-police assistance cases are
more comparable to extradition cases than to diplomatic protection cases, and
the approach taken should therefore mirror the approach taken in extradition
cases. In United States v Burns, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada
characterized extraditions as a form of mutual legal assistance,104 and it
follows that the principles that apply to extradition cases should also apply to
assistance cases. The following sets out why the current approaches are not
adequate, and explains why, as in extradition cases, there should be an
obligation to seek assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, and an
obligation to withhold assistance in the absence of such assurances.
B. Current Approaches: Restraining, But Not Prohibiting, the
Provision of Assistance
The European Union, the United Kingdom and Australia have all taken the
view that although assistance should generally not be provided, in some
circumstances assistance can be provided without seeking assurances, or can
be provided even if sought assurances are not forthcoming.
Article 11 of the Agreement between the European Union and Japan on
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, for example, permits, but
certainly does not demand, EU States to refuse assistance unless an assurance
is provided by Japan not to seek the death penalty.105 Before the British
government opted into this Agreement, the matter was debated by the
European Scrutiny Committee in Parliament, with the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Home Department stating that
Agreed Government policy, in mutual legal assistance cases in which there is a
risk of the death penalty being imposed for the crime under investigation, is that
we would seek assurances that anyone found guilty would not face the death
penalty before providing assistance.106
103 Commentary to art 16 (n 15) para 5. 104 United States v Burns (n 49) [73].
105 Agreement between the European Union and Japan on mutual legal assistance in criminal
matters [2010] OJ L39/20, art 11(1)(b) read in conjunction with art 11(4).
106 European Scrutiny Committee, Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters
between the EU and Japan (HC 2009–10, 4). <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200910/cmgeneral/euro/100202/100202s01.htm> accessed 8 October 2012.
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It is notable, though, that the UK has entered into several bilateral treaties that
do not explicitly state that assistance can be or must be refused without
assurances that the death penalty will not be sought or imposed.107 The treaties
do have clauses that allow the refusal of assistance if ‘the execution of the
request would prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other
essential interests of the Requested Party’,108 and it is possible for the
imposition of the death penalty to be construed as prejudicial to the ‘ordre
public’ or ‘essential interests’ of the United Kingdom, but it is by no means
clear that the UK must seek assurances and must not provide assistance without
such assurances.109
Indeed, there is no reference at all to the death penalty in the eighth or
ninth editions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Guidelines that is provided to
other countries that seek the UK’s assistance.110 This is in contrast to the
seventh edition, which speciﬁcally referred to the possibility of refusing
requests that were considered ‘inappropriate on public policy grounds (for
example, requests involving double jeopardy will not be executed; there are
also issues surrounding requests where the death penalty is an issue . . .)’.111
The removal of this reference hardly emphasizes a policy or obligation on the
part of the UK to refuse assistance without assurances. Indeed, the removal
of this reference suggests that there is no duty to even consider seeking
such assurances.112
The UK has recently moved towards creating an obligation to
consider withholding assistance without assurances that the death penalty
will not be sought. The 2011 ‘Overseas Security and Justice Assistance:
Human Rights Guidance’ makes it clear that risks to human rights
107 For a list of such treaties, see the website of the Foreign and Commonwealth Oﬃce: <http://
www.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and-documents/treaty-command-papers-ems/treaty-command-
papers-by-subject/crime> accessed 8 October 2012.
108 Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (Cmd 7879) (2009),
art 4. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3706546/3892733/21824849/Tr_VietnamMLA_
July2010> accessed 8 October 2012.
109 Having said this, the following response from the UK Central Authority to a request under
the Freedom of Information Act should be noted: ‘UKCA may refuse an MLA request if, for
instance, the execution of the request would prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public, or
other essential interests of the UK. This would include requests where the requesting State did not
give assurances that it would not seek the death penalty. I can therefore disclose that MLA has not
been provided in any cases where the requesting State refused to issue assurances that it would not
seek the death penalty.’ (Received on 10 May 2012. Request and response on ﬁle with the author).
110 Mutual Legal Assistance Guidelines for the United Kingdom (9th edn) 8 April 2011 <http://
www.homeoﬃce.gov.uk/publications/police/operational-policing/mla-guidelines-9th-ed?view=
Binary> accessed 8 October 2012.
111 Mutual Legal Assistance Guidelines for the United Kingdom (7th edn) 25 June 2009,
chapter 3, at 13. http://www.homeoﬃce.gov.uk/publications/police/operational-policing/MLA-
Guidelines-7th-edition?view=Binary> accessed 8 October 2012.
112 A request for an explanation under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 was refused on
1 May 2012 under section 35(1)(a) on the grounds that the formulation or development of
Government policy is exempt (request and response on ﬁle with the author).
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should be considered before the provision of assistance is made, and
paragraph 13 places the death penalty at the top of the list of such
human rights risks.113 However, in Annex B of the Guidance, the following
is written:
Where there is a signiﬁcant risk of the death penalty being imposed for the crime
under investigation, the policy is:
a) Written assurances should be sought before agreeing to the provision of
assistance that anyone found guilty would not face the death penalty.
b) Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to
seek assurances, Departmental Ministers (including FCO) should be
consulted to determine whether, given the speciﬁc circumstances of the case,
we should nevertheless provide assistance.
c) In exceptional circumstances, where it is imperative that we act quickly to
safeguard the integrity of evidence or protect British lives, UK personnel
should be allowed to deploy immediately without seeking assurances about
the death penalty. Departmental Ministers (including FCO) should be
consulted and consideration given to seeking assurances in slower time.114
Although the presumption is that assurances should be sought, there are some
unspeciﬁed circumstances in which the authorities can refrain from seeking
assurances, or can provide assistance even if sought assurances are not
forthcoming. Although there have to be ‘strong reasons’ for not seeking
assurances, no guidance is given as to what sorts of reasons will be ‘strong’
enough.
This issue has also received considerable attention in Australia. Until 2009,
the position was that unless a person had already been charged with an oﬀence
that carries the death penalty, Australian authorities could provide assistance
irrespective of whether or not the investigation might later lead to the
imposition of the death penalty. This much is made clear in the ‘Australian
Federal Police (AFP) Practical Guide on International Police-to-Police
Assistance in Death Penalty Charge Situations’.115 However, this Guide was
reviewed following the Bali Nine case in 2005–06. In this case, the AFP
assisted Indonesian authorities with the arrest of nine Australians on drug-
traﬃcking charges, three of whom were sentenced to death. Although a legal
challenge against the AFP failed in 2006,116 the public outcry that resulted
from the prospect of Australians being executed with the assistance of
113 Although this list is not ranked in order of importance, it is nonetheless striking that the death
penalty is at the top of the list.
114 ‘Overseas Security and Justice Assistance: Human Rights Guidance’ (n 99) 16 (emphasis
added).
115 The AFP Practical Guide is available through the website of the New South Wales Council
for Civil Liberties website: <http://www.nswccl.org.au/docs/pdf/afp%20dp%20guidelines.pdf>
accessed 8 October 2012.
116 Rush v Commissioner of Police [2006] FCA 12 (Federal Court of Australia).
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Australian authorities117 led to the adoption in 2009 of the ‘AFP Practical
Guide on International Police-to-Police Assistance in Potential Death Penalty
Situations’.118
The 2009 Guide sets out ten factors that must be taken into account before
assistance is provided in a situation involving or potentially involving the death
penalty. The factors include things such as ‘the person’s age and personal
circumstances’, ‘the potential risks to the person, and other persons, in not
providing the information’, and ‘Australia’s interest in promoting and securing
cooperation from overseas agencies in combating crime.’
The AFP is only obliged to consider these factors, and is not obliged to
withhold assistance even if it is considered likely that the death penalty will
be imposed. The rationale for limiting the obligation to merely considering
withholding assistance is that Australia, like all other States, has a public
policy interest in tackling crime, especially transnational crimes such as
drug traﬃcking that directly aﬀect the State. It follows that States should
therefore have the discretion to provide assistance notwithstanding the
potential imposition of the death penalty. This mirrors the approach taken in
Australian legislation. Section 8 of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Act 1987, as amended in 1996, speciﬁcally states that:
A request by a foreign country for assistance under this Act must be refused if
it relates to the prosecution or punishment of a person charged with, or convicted
of, an oﬀence in respect of which the death penalty may be imposed in the
foreign country, unless the Attorney-General is of the opinion, having regard to
the special circumstances of the case, that the assistance requested should be
granted.119
Finlay has argued that this approach is compatible with Australia’s obligations
under international and domestic law relating to the prohibition of the death
penalty,120 writing that ‘Australia’s current approach strikes an appropriate
and practical balance between competing public policy interests, namely
Australia’s opposition to the death penalty and broader law enforcement
objectives.’121 As the Law Council of Australia has pointed out, though,
treating the abolition of the death penalty as a public policy consideration is
not consistent with Australia’s stated opposition to the death penalty in all
117 See references to media reports discussed in L Finlay, ‘Exporting the Death Penalty?
Reconciling International Police Cooperation and the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Australia’
(2011) 33 Sydney Law Review 95.
118 For the AFP Guide, see <http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_
l205401745_text> and <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/~/media/afp/pdf/ips-foi-documents/
ips/publication-list/OG00014%20-%20International%20police%20to%20police%20assistance%
20in%20death%20penalty.ashx> accessed 8 October 2012.
119 Emphasis added. In Rush v Commissioner of Police (n 116), it was held that the Bali Nine
case did not fall under this Act because the Indonesian authorities had not made a formal request for
assistance. The AFP volunteered the information to the Indonesian authorities.
120 Finlay (n 117). 121 ibid 96.
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circumstances.122 The abolition and opposition of the death penalty is not a
public policy objective that can be set aside when expedient to do so, and
therefore assistance should be withheld when assurances are not forthcoming,
regardless of the State interest in combating crime.123
The Law Council’s criticisms do not appear to have been taken on
board by the Ministry of Justice, since the revised Guidelines published
in February 2012 retains the list of ten factors. The new ‘AFP National
Guideline on international police-to-police assistance in death penalty
situations’124 draws a distinction between those cases where no person has
been arrested or charged, and those cases where an individual has been arrested
or charged. In cases involving the former, any request for assistance that
potentially has death penalty implications must go through a formal approval
process ‘when there is a reasonable likelihood that the assistance to be
provided will result in a person being arrested, detained, charged or convicted
for a death penalty oﬀence’.125 This goes further than the 2009 Practical
Guide as it puts the onus on the AFP to inquire whether there is potential for
the death penalty to be an issue. However, the AFP is still able to provide
assistance in potential death penalty situations, provided the ten factors
have been taken into account. In cases involving persons already arrested or
charged with oﬀences that attract the death penalty, assistance can only be
given with the approval of the Attorney General or the Minster for Home
Aﬀairs and Justice. There is little guidance, though, on how the Attorney
General or Minister will come to their decisions, and of course there is still
explicitly scope for assistance to be provided notwithstanding the risk of the
death penalty.
C. An Obligation to Seek Assurances, And to Withhold Assistance
without Assurances
As the European Court of Human Rights and Human Rights Committee have
said in extradition cases, the prohibition of the death penalty brings with it the
obligation to ensure that no individuals are put at risk of the death penalty in
any country. Given that extradition is a type of mutual legal assistance,126
it follows that abolitionist States should refuse the provision of assistance
without similar assurances. Indeed, in Al-Saadoon, the European Court
122 Letter from Glenn Ferguson, President of the Law Council of Australia, to The Hon Brendan
O’Connor MP, Minister for Home Aﬀairs, 29 January 2010. <http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/
shadomx/apps/fms/fmsdownload.cfm?ﬁle_uuid=D02680F0-1E4F-17FA-D22C-26C61CEDF5C2&
siteName=lca> accessed 8 October 2012.
123 For example, it is unclear why a person’s age is relevant to such determinations, when
Australia prohibits the death penalty in all cases, regardless of age.
124 Available at <http://www.afp.gov.au/about-the-afp/~/media/afp/pdf/ips-foi-documents/ips/
publication-list/NAT12011%20International%20Police-to-police%20Assistance%20in%20Death
%20Penalty%20Situations%2014MAY2012.ashx> accessed 8 October 2012.
125 Emphasis added. 126 United States v Burns (n 49) [73].
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rejected the UK’s argument that it was obliged to hand the applicants to the
Iraqi authorities because of its obligations under international law, stating that
Contracting States are not permitted to enter into agreements with another State
which conﬂicts with its obligations under the ECHR.127 In the context of MLA
and police-to-police assistance, and in the context of ongoing assistance, this
can be reworded to read: ‘it is not open to a Contracting State to enter into an
agreement to provide legal or police or other assistance to another State if such
assistance conﬂicts with its obligations under the Convention.’ While States
must be able to assist each other in the ﬁght against crime, the prohibition and
opposition of the death penalty is not something that can be set aside for the
sake of convenience. Abolitionist States do not set aside opposition to the death
penalty when crimes that shock the public occur in a domestic setting, despite
calls to do so, and it follows that such States must not be complicit in the
administration of the death penalty elsewhere for expedient’s sake, even if the
actual or threatened crime has an impact in the abolitionist State. Abolitionist
States should therefore ensure that assistance is only provided when assurances
have been received that the death penalty will not be imposed as the result of
any such aid or assistance.
The approach put forward above takes its lead from the law that applies
to extradition cases. A possible counterargument to the above is that, in
extradition cases, States are only under a duty to seek assurances because
the individual at risk of facing the death penalty is within the jurisdiction of the
abolitionist State. In contrast, in other types of assistance cases, there is no
identiﬁable individual within the jurisdiction of the abolitionist State, thus
placing a jurisdictional limit on the scope of the abolitionist States’ obligations.
The issue of jurisdictional limits is also applicable to the next method of
complicity—the supply of materials that can be used in executions—and is
therefore considered in detail after an outline of this fourth method of
complicity. It will be argued that States should not hide behind the veil of
jurisdictional limits.
VI. THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING, OR ENABLING THE PROVISION
OF, MATERIALS THAT ARE USED IN EXECUTIONS
Abolitionist States might knowingly or inadvertently facilitate the use
of the death penalty elsewhere by providing materials that are used in
executions. In recent years, steps have been taken to restrict trade in such
goods, and it is arguable that a legal obligation to refrain from providing,
or enabling the provision of, materials that can be used in executions is
developing.
A useful starting point for this discussion is 2005, when the European Union
adopted a regulation that introduced export controls on goods that are used in
127 Al-Saadoon v United Kingdom (n 1) [138].
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capital punishment.128 The restrictions imposed by this regulation—commonly
called the Torture Regulation because it also imposes controls on goods that
are used in torture—is limited to goods that are solely designed for use in
executions, such as electric chairs, gallows, and automatic drug injection
systems. In more recent years, there have been concerns with the exporting of
drugs that are used in lethal injections. In the United States, lethal injections
have historically consisted of a cocktail of three drugs, which are imported
from companies overseas.129
In R (Zagorski and Bale) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and
Skills,130 the claimants—US citizens facing the death penalty in the United
States—sought controls on the export of sodium thiopental from a company
based in the UK. The claimants, though, failed in their challenge under the
Torture Regulations, with the High Court pointing out that the regulations only
imposed controls on the export of goods that had no other use than for the
death penalty, and did not prohibit ‘the export of goods which “could be used”
for the purpose of capital punishment’.131 The Court noted that the drug in
question could also be used for legitimate medical purposes, and therefore held
that no export controls should be imposed.
Although Zagorski and Bale did not succeed in their legal challenge,
several private companies and abolitionist States have subsequently taken
steps to ensure that they do not knowingly or inadvertently supply prisons
with the drugs required for lethal injections. In November 2010, the British
Government enacted controls after it became clear that the US was importing
the drug from UK companies for the sole and speciﬁc purpose of lethal
injections. The UK has also enacted controls on the export of pancuronium
bromide, potassium chloride, sodium pentobarbital and propofol, a drug that
prison authorities have turned to in the wake of the restrictions on the supply of
sodium thiopental.132 The pharmaceutical ﬁrm Hospira, based in Italy, has
ceased exporting sodium thiopental for the same reason (but still exports
pancuronium bromide), and in Germany the Trade Minister Philipp Rösler in
2011 refused a request from the US Commerce Secretary to export sodium
128 Council Regulation (EC) 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used
for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
[2005] OJ L200/1, Annex II.
129 Companies in the US generally do not produce these drugs since there is little proﬁt to be
made from them.
130 R (Zagorski and Bale) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2010] EWHC
3110 (Admin). 131 ibid [46].
132 See ‘The consolidated list of strategic military and dual-use items that require export
authorisation (Annex III)’, Department for Business Innovation and Skills (August 2012). The
short title of the List is ‘The UK Strategic Export Controls List’ and it can be viewed at <http://
www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/eco/docs/control-lists/12-1014-uk-strategic-export-control-list-
consolidated.pdf> accessed 10 December 2012. Also see the associated press release from the
Department for Business Innovation and Skills: <http://news.bis.gov.uk/Press-Releases/
Government-bans-export-of-lethal-injection-drugs-to-the-US-6657f.aspx> accessed 10 December
2012.
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thiopental for use in lethal injections.133 The Danish company Lundbeck has
also ceased trading in drugs that are used in lethal injections. It is not just
companies in European countries that have taken steps to cease trade in
chemicals that can be used in lethal injections—in November 2011, the Indian
pharmaceutical ﬁrm Naari recalled its supply of sodium thiopental from the
state of Nebraska after ﬁnding out that the drugs were to be used in
executions.134 US authorities have attempted to amend the three-drug cocktail
in light of these developments, with the state of Missouri, for example,
implementing a one-drug method of lethal injection. The single drug to be used
—propofol—was to be imported from the German ﬁrm Fresenius Kabi, but this
ﬁrm has also resisted trading in materials that are used in lethal injections.135
In addition to these private companies taking steps to restrict the trade of
materials that can be used in executions, the European Union amended the
2005 Torture Regulation on 20 December 2011 to include chemicals used in
lethal injections, illustrating the move towards prohibiting all trade in materials
that might be used to administer capital punishment.136 All these actions
represent recognition on the part of States, companies, and the European Union
that, at least on moral and political grounds, abolitionist States should not
facilitate the administration of the death penalty elsewhere by providing the
materials that are required to carry out executions.
Despite these developments, the extent to which abolitionist States are under
a legal duty under international law to ensure that private companies under
their jurisdiction do not trade in such materials has not been as well articulated
as the other obligations discussed in this paper. This is arguably because of
jurisdictional limitations. Zagorski and Bale’s legal challenge also faltered on
jurisdictional grounds because they were not at any material time under the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, and thus could not rely on the protections
of the ECHR or the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. This question of
jurisdiction is also relevant to the provision of assistance discussed above, and
it is a question that requires particular attention.
VII. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS ON THE OBLIGATION TO REFRAIN FROM AIDING
AND ASSISTING THE USE OF THE DEATH PENALTY
The last two methods of complicity discussed above—the provision of
assistance and the supply of materials used in executions—raise diﬃcult
133 ‘German Minister Denies US Request for Execution Drugs’ Der Spiegel, 6 September 2011
< http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/european-opposition-to-death-penalty-german-
minister-denies-us-request-for-execution-drugs-a-767613.html > accessed 8 October 2012.
134 Information about the recent controls on the exportation of drugs to the United States of
America can be found at Reprieve’s Stop the Lethal Injection Project website: <http://www.
reprieve.org.uk/investigations/executiondrugs/> accessed 8 October 2012.
135 On this development, see <http://reprieve.org.uk/publiceducation/2012_03_26_
slip_further_detail/> accessed 8 October 2012.
136 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1352/2011 [2011] OJ L 338.
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questions relating to jurisdiction. In her article on the AFP Practical Guide,
Lorraine Finlay explains why, in her view, the Second Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR does not prohibit Australia from providing mutual legal and police-to-
police assistance in actual or potential death penalty cases. Article 1 of the
Second Protocol refers to the prohibition of the death penalty ‘within the
jurisdiction’ of a State party, and Finlay argues:
The wording of this article places a clear and unambiguous jurisdictional
limitation on the nature of the obligation. The article does not impose an
obligation on States not to expose a person to the real risk of the application of the
death penalty. Rather, the language expressly limits the obligation to the abolition
of the death penalty within the State’s own jurisdiction.137
In extradition and diplomatic protection cases, the individual at risk of the
death penalty is clearly within the jurisdiction of the abolitionist State. In
extradition cases, the abolitionist State has territorial jurisdiction over the
individual, and in diplomatic protection cases, ‘. . . although the State in which
the wrong was perpetrated has territorial jurisdiction over the alien, the State of
nationality retains its personal jurisdiction over its national, even while he or
she is residing in another State.’138 However, if for example the UK provides
intelligence to Iran which is then used to arrest, try and execute an Iranian
national in Iran, the UK cannot be responsible under the ECHR for the
violation of that individual’s rights. As already noted, Zagorski and Bale’s
legal challenge against the export of drugs that are used in lethal injections
faltered on jurisdictional grounds.
To say that States owe no duty to protect the rights of individuals outside its
territorial or personal jurisdiction, though, depends on rather narrow
conceptions of jurisdiction and obligations under human rights treaties. There
is extensive case law and literature that demonstrates the ever-increasing
extraterritorial scope of obligations under human rights treaties,139 and it is
plausible to argue that the requirement of jurisdiction is satisﬁed when the act
that leads to the wrong occurs within the territory or eﬀective control of the
137 Finlay (n 117) 109 (emphasis in original).
138 Amerasinghe (n 67) 23. Also see G Leigh, ‘Nationality and Diplomatic Protection’ (1971)
20 ICLQ 453.
139 For a fuller account of jurisdiction under the ECHR following Al-Skeini, see A Cowen, ‘A
New Watershed? Reevaluating Bankovic´ in light of Al-Skeini’ (2012) 1 Cambridge Journal of
International and Comparative Law 213. For accounts of the extraterritorial application of human
rights treaties generally, see M Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties:
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abolitionist State. An examination of some of the authorities will explain why
this is a plausible approach to the question of jurisdiction.
The European Court of Human Rights has noted that ‘the term ‘jurisdiction’
is not limited to the national territory of the High Contracting Parties; their
responsibility can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing
eﬀects outside their own territory.’140 This was given a narrow interpretation
by the Court in Bankovic´ v Belgium,141 which was accepted by the House of
Lords in R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence.142 In these cases, it was
stated that the rights guaranteed by the ECHR could only be relied upon by
those within the territory of a Member State, ‘other bases of jurisdiction being
exceptional and requiring special justiﬁcation in the particular circumstances
of each case . . .’.143 In 2011, though, in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom,144 the
European Court widened the concept of jurisdiction for the purposes of the
ECHR, holding that a State has jurisdiction for acts committed extraterritorially
when it exercises ‘public powers’ on the territory of another State. This
illustrates a growing concern among the judiciary about the extraterritorial
abuse of Convention rights.
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR stipulates that a State party must respect and
protect the rights of ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction’. The Human Rights Committee has stated that this ‘means that a
State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to
anyone within the power or eﬀective control of that State Party, even if not
situated within the territory of the State Party’.145 This approach to jurisdiction
was adopted by the International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion
on Israel’s construction of a security wall in the West Bank, in relation to
the applicability of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.146
It is clear, then, that obligations under human rights treaties extend beyond
territorial borders, but it remains to be seen whether the provision of assistance
or materials that are used in executions can be construed as the exercise of
‘public powers’ as per the ECHR, or whether the person at risk of the death
penalty in these types of cases can be deemed to be ‘within the power or
eﬀective control’ of the abolitionist State as per the ICCPR. It would be
diﬃcult to make the case that abolitionist States have power or eﬀective control
over individuals in these cases, and it is also diﬃcult to argue that an
abolitionist State is exercising ‘public powers’ abroad when it supplies or
140 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain (App no 12747/87) (1992) 14 EHRR 745.
141 Bankovic´ v Belgium and Others (App no 52207/99) (2007) 44 EHRR 1.
142 R (Al-Skeini) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26.
143 Bankovic´ (n 141) [61].
144 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (App no 55721/07) (2011) 53 EHRR 18.
145 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, para 10.
146 ICJ Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 131.
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allows the supply of materials that are used in executions. However, it is
certainly arguable that the presence of, for example, UK police abroad to help
with investigations constitutes the exercise of ‘public powers’ in the territory of
another State. Although of course the police themselves would not impose
the death penalty as such, when considered alongside the extradition cases
of Soering and Al-Saadoon, it is clear that abolitionist States need to be
more careful about providing assistance without assurances that the death
penalty will not be imposed. Moreover, the developing law on the scope of
extraterritorial obligations under human rights treaties suggests that the issue of
jurisdictional limits need not be determinative of the scope of abolitionist
States’ secondary obligations to refrain from facilitating the use of the death
penalty elsewhere. In an article on the relationship between mutual legal
assistance and human rights, Robert Currie discusses the provision of evidence
to another State for use in an unfair trial, noting that: ‘To provide evidence for
use in a foreign criminal procedure that amounts to a “ﬂagrant denial” of fair
trial rights, simply on the basis that “our human rights obligations don’t cover
the accused,” may render the requested State complicit in conduct which it
has agreed to prohibit, necessarily leaving a bad taste from a legal and moral
standpoint.’147 The same can be said about the provision of assistance that
leads to the imposition of the death penalty: knowingly facilitating the death
penalty to occur abroad, but not taking steps to prevent this merely because
‘our human rights obligations don’t cover the accused’, leaves a questionable
aftertaste, and it is for this reason that the UK government, the UNODC, the
Australian Federal Police and the European Union have all taken some steps to
address the relationship between the provision of assistance and materials and
other resources, and the use of the death penalty. These authorities have not
attempted to hide behind the issue of jurisdictional limits, and this issue should
therefore not be used as a means of limiting the obligation to refrain from
aiding and assisting the use of the death penalty elsewhere.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
It would seem that whenever abolitionist States have facilitated the use of the
death penalty elsewhere, they have done so inadvertently, rather than
intentionally. This is arguably because of the lack of any comprehensive
outline of the secondary obligations imposed on abolitionist States to refrain
from aiding and assisting the use of the death penalty elsewhere. At present,
these legal, political and moral obligations are somewhat disjointed, as court
judgments such as Al-Saadoon, and political and moral eﬀorts such as the
UK’s Strategy for Global Abolition of the Death Penalty, and the Australian
Federal Police’s guidelines, have emerged in the absence of any clearly
articulated list of obligations. Although these abolitionist States have
147 Currie (n 89) 153.
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themselves weaved a web of obligations to ensure that their actions do not
directly or indirectly facilitate the administration of the death penalty, such
States have not been consistent in their approaches, either between themselves
or within themselves. This has been particularly true in cases involving the
provision of resources and aid for anti-drug traﬃcking initiatives in countries
that still impose the death penalty for drug oﬀences.
The enactment of oﬃcial policies on extradition, diplomatic protection,
mutual legal assistance and police-to-police assistance, and controls on the
exportation of goods that can be used in executions, go some way to limiting, if
not eradicating, State complicity in the use of the death penalty. To ensure that
abolitionist States adopt a consistent and more eﬀective approach to avoiding
complicity in the use of the death penalty, though, it would perhaps help if a
comprehensive list of positive and negative duties was drawn up, comparable
to EU Torture Regulations. This article has gone some way to developing
such a list.
It is important for State practice to continue in the direction that it has been
going, so that such practice can inﬂuence the interpretation of restrictions on
activities that advertently or inadvertently assist the administration of the
death penalty elsewhere. State practice was instrumental in the European Court
of Human Rights’ decision in Al-Saadoon, and abolitionist States should
therefore be encouraged to continue issuing policies and oﬃcial pronounce-
ments to the eﬀect that they will not engage in activities that facilitate the use
of the death penalty, regardless of jurisdictional limits and so on. Moreover,
particularly in instances of case-speciﬁc and ongoing assistance in criminal
investigations, these policies should make it clear that, as in cases involving
extradition and the death penalty, opposition to the death penalty will not be
set aside on policy and national interest grounds. This would certainly more
closely align with States’ principled opposition to the death penalty both at
home and abroad.
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